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Zheng addresses what has been both an influential thesis in her field and
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a common view on racialized preferences: racialized preferences are 'mere
preferences' and for this reason, racialized preferences are not morally
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generally considered morally innocuous. Examples of mere preferences may

Introduction
In her paper, “Why Yellow Fever Isn’t Flattering: A Case Against Racial

include preferences for hair color, height or style of dress. For instance,

Fetishes,”1 Robin Zheng argues convincingly that the 'mere preferences'

happening to only want to date, have sex with or be romantically involved with

objection to the impermissibility of racialized sexual preferences fails. Zheng

people with generous beards would count as a mere preference. My example of

contends that racialized fetishes are morally objectionable, not “mere” personal

a predilection for the generously bearded would strike most people as morally

preferences. She looks beyond the genealogy of the fetishizer’s preferences to

acceptable. Indeed, I guess that many share the belief that people have basic

analyze the disproportionate psychological burdens fetishizers place on the

aesthetic preferences about sex and that these are not particularly morally

fetishized and the role these preferences play in reinforcing harmful racial

troubling. More importantly, it is unreasonable to think that people ought not

stereotypes. I find Zheng’s reasoning compelling and interesting beyond its own

discriminate on any basis at all with regard to their sexual partners. That sounds

scope because her work opens up ways of making similar arguments against the

uncomfortably like claiming that people owe one another an open possibility of

permissibility of any sexual preferences that reproduce systemic injustice. In this

sexual partnership; most people place great importance on their preferences for

paper I reconstruct Zheng’s argument, motivating her line of thought as best as I

certain groups, such as sexes or genders.
Zheng reconstructs the common sense, 'mere preferences' argument

can, then I show how her argument can be extended to sexual preferences for

often used to claim that racialized preferences are also morally innocuous:

inegalitarian sexual encounters. I begin by criticizing the idea that preferences
for inegalitarian sex don’t stem from misogyny; I suspect that far more often
than not these preferences are the result of sexism and misogyny, and at any rate
we aren’t in the epistemic position to rule this out. But even if an individual’s
inegalitarian preference did not have a misogynistic source, this would not imply
that acting on the preference is morally innocuous. Rather, the social harms
caused by acting on such preferences render them morally troublesome.

1. There is nothing morally objectionable about sexual
preferences for hair color, eye color, and other non-racialized
phenotypic traits.
2. Preferences for racialized physical traits are not morally
different from preferences for non-racialized phenotypic traits.
Therefore,
3. ‘Mere’ preferences for racialized phenotypic traits are not
morally objectionable.2
Zheng argues that we should reject the second premise. The first reason

Zheng’s Argument Against Racialized Preferences

she gives for doing so is that those very traits assumed to be morally innocuous
2 Zheng, Robin. (2016). “Why Yellow Fever Isn’t Flattering: A Case Against Racial
Fetishes.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2 (3), 400-419.

1 See Langton, Rae. (1993) “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts.”Philosophy and
Public Affairs, 22 (4): 293-330.
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are, in fact, based on harmful stereotypes, and it is for this reason that the mere

origins.

preferences argument fails. She draws from literature that strongly suggests that

Zheng argues that there are externalities of racialized preferences that

the so-called mere preferences stem from racial stereotypes. For instance, Zheng

merit consideration, and that we should shift our gaze from the origins of an

cites a study in which non-Asian men dating Asian women were interviewed.

individual’s preference to the social effects of the preference. In this hierarchical

The interviewees initially disavowed racial stereotypes of Asian women as

world, the targets of racialized sexual preferences can feel depersonalized and

submissive but later they used language that effectively depicted Asian women

otherized. The fetishized must negotiate their reasonable doubts regarding the

as submissive.3 Zhen reviews a staggering amount of literature supporting the

motives behind their partners’ love for them, questioning their status as a unique

conclusion that many with racialized preferences also harbor racist beliefs. The

person in the eyes of their partners. Those affected by particularly pervasive

empirical evidence alone should incline most to be skeptical that racialized

racialized fetishization constantly and systematically experience these nagging

preferences reflect mere aesthetic ones, according to Zheng.

thoughts and they often adjust their behavior in light of them. This constant

More importantly, it seems difficult or impossible to rule out the

mental struggle takes a very real psychological toll on a person, and this toll is

possibility that racialized preferences stem from racial stereotypes. In a world

disproportionate and unjust. Zheng appeals to intuitions regarding justice to

where racial hierarchies persist and racist stereotypes are ubiquitous and

motivate the belief that certain preferences ought to be subject to moral

insidious, it may be impossible to know where one’s preferences stem from.

evaluation: “It is morally problematic, indeed unjust, when some people suffer

Even if a person has good reason to believe she knows the origin of a particular

disproportionate harms or burdens on the basis of their race and when they are

preference – perhaps a first serious partner embodied this preference – she can't

wrongly represented in their sexual capacities.”4

rule out the effects of objectionable cultural factors accompanying the innocuous

Zheng argues that in themselves these psychological burdens constitute

main factor. This discernment seems especially impossible given the subtle

a disadvantage on the basis of race, but they also have broader societal

influences of media and popular culture.

consequences. Even in the best cases of coupling motivated by racialized

However, even if someone could somehow know for certain that her

preferences , the partnerships could still inadvertently enforce racial stereotypes.

racialized preference did not stem from any harmful stereotype, it does not

Zheng draws from Charles Mills’ observation about black men marrying white

follow that there is no reason to find racialized preferences morally

women; she writes, “Even if it were possible for such men to be free of the

objectionable. Zheng identifies an alternative – and in her view a more effective

suspicion that they are motivated by racial self-contempt, the meaning of their

and just – means of criticizing racialized preferences. She claims that because

actions would be, in his words, ‘sending a message to the world that ... black

acting on these preferences takes a disproportionate psychological toll on the

women just ain’t good enough.’”5 Zheng recalls the words of another

fetishized, racialized preferences are morally objectionable regardless of their
4 Ibid. 407.
3 Ibid. 405.

Ephemeris 2019

5 Ibid. 412.

15

Ephemeris 2019

16

A Case Against Inegalitarian Sexual Preferences

A Case Against Inegalitarian Sexual Preferences

interviewee, an Asian woman, “That’s how people see me, as somebody who

they glorify rather than stigmatize.”7 Using the broad contours of Zheng’s

should be with a white man.”6 Even those who aren’t in interracial or other such

argument, I will show how a similar case can be made that acting on preferences

socially significant relationships feel the impact of the salience of their sexual

for heterosexual activity that subordinates women is morally problematic.8

choices.

By inegalitarian sex I am referring to a preference for the type of sex
often depicted in mainstream pornography.9 A. W. Eaton refers to this

These observations do not lead Zheng to make a broad
recommendation to avoid certain sexual or romantic relationships; she is not

pornography as inegalitarian pornography, “Sexually explicit representations

claiming that black men should never marry white women. Instead, she is

that as a whole eroticize relations (acts, scenarios, or postures) characterized by

motivating the claim that sexual preferences are subject to moral consideration

gender inequity.”10 While Eaton is characterizing a certain kind of pornography,

of their social impact. It might strike some as unfair that other people’s racist

I think the kind of sex it depicts manifests the type of sexual preferences I wish

interpretations could color ethical judgment of their preferences. Even more

to discuss. Importantly, the kind of inegalitarian sex I am concerned with in this

worrisome, people who don’t have racialized preferences but who happen to be

paper just is much of what is eroticized in mainstream pornography. These

in a relationship susceptible to interpretation as racist might inadvertently

sexual activities include, but are in no way limited to, the eroticization of

promote prejudice. However Zheng can reply that her compilation of empirical

violence towards women or of demeaning or subordinating sexual relations,

evidence shows it is racialized preference usually comes into being under the

scenarios with a clear power imbalance (even if consensual), or scenarios in

influence of racism. It would be inappropriate to condemn your preference for
7 Ibid. 413.

the heavily bearded unless this preference likely came from bigoted beliefs
stemming from a history of oppression of bearded people. But even if the origin
of your preference is innocent, I suspect Zheng's best reply is to point out that
the fact that certain couples will have to negotiate harmful social interpretations
or be burdened with contributing to these interpretations is just another harm
caused by racialized preferences, and the hierarchies from which they are born.
The Inegalitarian Extension

9 I want to be clear about the types of preferences I am examining. For probably
obvious reasons, this argument may have implications for people with a preference for
BDSM (bondage/discipline/dominance/submission/sadism/masochism) sexual activity. I
will not be including this community in my discussion despite the fact that my
conclusions may implicate the activity of at least some of these members of this group. A
more careful examination of the ethics of acting on these preferences is necessary,
especially as activity strictly confined to this group will likely not cause the harms I will
detail in my discussion. Thanks to Elizabeth Barnes for pressing me on this point.

Zheng opens up for us the possibility there could be other sexual
preferences that are morally problematic, cases where the preference is
“systematized so as to track and reproduce institutions of oppression, even if

6 Ibid. 411.
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8 For the time being, this thesis applies to men and women engaging in heterosexual
sex. In forthcoming papers, I plan to consider what this argument means for gender nonconforming individuals and those having Queer sex. I have chosen to narrow this
argument not because I believe it is sufficient to address only heterosexual relations but
because I believe a more careful argument (exceeding the bounds of this project) is
necessary to tease out the implications of inegalitarian preferences in Queer sex, and
because it is not clear to me that the mainstream inegalitarian sex to which I refer
includes those in Queer communities. As a result, I am not confident that this argument in
its simple form holds up when applied to Queer sex.

10 Eaton, A. W. (2007) “A Sensible Antiporn Feminism.” Ethics 117: 674–715.
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which women’s pleasure is discounted. Like Eaton, I am not counting scenes

the supposedly innocent origins of these preferences. Zheng is right that

where there are eroticized inegalitarian relations which are on a whole balanced

preferences are likely greatly shaped by the influence of the media, common

– like partners taking turns being the dominant and submissive one – and I am

beliefs and group membership, and that no one is unaffected by such social

taking “gender inequality” to refer to the subordination of women, not the

factors. For these reasons, I take it as likely that most people’s preferences are

subordination of men in heterosexual sex.11

shaped to some extent by society.
Sexual preferences aren’t formed in a vacuum; and I think it’s reasonable to think

In an age where this type of encounter is widely depicted and
normalized, I can imagine someone defending his sexual preferences as a mere

that social factors play a role in the preferences we develop. I’ll give an account of how

quirk of his personality or a fun fact about the way he likes to have sex. I see

one particularly significant social factor influences sexual preference drawing on Rae

this defense as in the spirit of the 'mere preference argument' with which Zheng

Langton’s discussion on the 'authority' of pornography in her paper, “Speech Acts and

takes issue. For the purposes of my paper, I would like to be a bit more explicit

Unspeakable Acts.”12 I have said that the inegalitarian sex portrayed in

about what characterizes a 'mere preference'. I broadly conceive of 'mere

pornography is representative of the type of sex someone with an inegalitarian

preference' as any preferences relating to sex that most would consider morally

sexual preference prefers. However, pornography is not merely representative of

innocuous. On my view, preference for a way of having sex – be it a specific sex

this particular preference, it and its cultural ramifications actively shape

act, the language used during an encounter or the tone of the encounter – can

inegalitarian sexual preferences. When Langton claims that pornography is

count as mere preference. For instance, many people happen to be aroused by

authoritative, she means that pornography is considered a source of expert

parts of their partner’s body that are not typically erogenous zones. Such an

guidance on sexual relations, and that pornography has the power to endorse and

idiosyncrasy could reflect a simple sexual preference. But I reject what I take to

instruct. Through watching pornography or indirectly being exposed to its

be a common assumption that a preference for the kind of inegalitarian sex

influence, people learn what is generally expected in a sexual encounter.

portrayed in mainstream pornography is a matter of 'mere' preference.

Additionally, people don’t merely view pornography the way one would view an

Inegalitarian sexual preferences reproduce oppression; they are certainly not

action movie; they use pornography. For these reasons, pornography shapes not

'mere' preferences.

only people’s expectations and societal norms about sexualities and sex, but it
physically encodes what is viewed as “sexy”.13

If sex acts and tone can count as some sort of mere preference, I can

I suspect that most would acknowledge that pornography is pervasive

imagine someone arguing that preferences for inegalitarian sex are morally
innocuous in a way similar to mere preferences: people simply like what they

and that the pornography industry has a significant influence in the realms of

like. Like Zheng, I argue these preferences have significant links to gendered

advertising and the general media. For this reason, it seems few can escape

violence and the subordination of women but first I want to examine the idea of

12 Langton, Rae. (1993) “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts.”Philosophy and Public
Affairs, 22 (4): 293-330.

11 Ibid.

13 Langton (1993).
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experiencing the sexualized submission of women. If pornography is

paper does by no means cover the extent of them. Considering all this, it seems

authoritative, and if it often depicts inegalitarian relations, and if it filters

we can respond to our defensive preferer of inegalitarian sex (and likely

through to other, less explicit media, and if media and culture – broadly

consumer of pornography) that his preferences likely can be traced back to some

speaking – influence sexual preferences, then there is reason to suspect that

sort of sexism. And at any rate, he isn’t in the position to know that his

inegalitarian pornography has some influence upon our preferences. In other

preferences don’t stem from some insidious (or overt) sexism.

words, given that the inegalitarian scenes depicted in and endorsed by

Accordingly it is reasonable to believe that preferences for inegalitarian

pornography are pervasive and insidious, it seems very plausible that at least

sex often stem from stereotypical, sexist beliefs about women. However even if

some – although I suspect it is the majority – of inegalitarian preferences stem

a person could somehow know for sure that they lacked these stereotypical

from inegalitarian pornography.

beliefs and that their sexual preferences did not stem from stereotypes about

I argue that preference for inegalitarian sex likely stems in part from

women, it does not follow that acting on such preferences is morally innocuous.

exposure to inegalitarian pornography, among other kinds of subliminal cultural

A preference for inegalitarian sex harms the targets of the preference by

messaging. Eaton provides further reasons to worry that a preference for

wrongly representing them in their sexual capacities and agency. For instance,

inegalitarian sex involves stereotypical beliefs about women as it is particularly

the sexist belief that women like experiencing pain in sexual encounters might

effective in encouraging acceptance of gender inequality:

factor into the pornography people consume, which in turn affects their sexual
preferences. In the post-Fifty Shades of Gray era, preferences for inegalitarian

Transforming gender inequality into a source of sexual
gratification renders this inequality not just tolerable and easier to
accept but also desirable and highly enjoyable....This eroticization
makes gender inequality appealing to men and women alike.
Insofar as women want to be attractive to men, they internalize
the subordinating norms of attractiveness and thereby collaborate
in their own oppression.14

sex are no longer fringe (if they ever were). Specifically, inegalitarian sex
harmfully objectifies women and prevents them from exploring their own
sexualities.
The preference for inegalitarian sex harms the targets of the preference

The point is not that pornography imposes just one stereotype on women, not all

certain sexual goods. Zheng succinctly observes that women are often “wrongly

women are portrayed as submissive; some women are assumed to be, for

represented as only valuable in virtue of their sexual capacities, as desiring to be

example, “feisty”, “aggressive”, or even asexual in virtue of their race, class,

raped, etc.”15 Generally, women are rendered objects of violent desire. The

ability, sex assigned at birth, or other salient social identity. But it is still quite

features Martha Nussbaum identifies as constituting objectification include that

clear that women as a class are portrayed as subordinate, and so also actively
subordinated, even if not every woman is portrayed as submissive. Pornography

the woman is treated as an instrument of the other person’s sexual pleasure, as
lacking autonomy, as interchangeable with other women, as something that can

can draw from and perpetuate a rich history of oppressive stereotypes and this
14 Eaton, A. W. (2007). 679-680.
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15 Zheng. (2016). 407.
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be owned, and as something whose feelings or wishes need not be considered.

sex would be morally unobjectionable. Or maybe even in an unjust world these

While some women may experience sexual pleasure from being objectified,

preferences could be innocuous if only they were less ubiquitous. However, our

many women do not. Objectification makes many feel grossly dehumanizedand

world has a messy legacy of a continuous history of oppression, and responsible

violated. It often renders women unable to negotiate their own desires in sex. It

people aiming to do good should strive to behave in such a way that makes our

renders her desires irrelevant or deems them non-existent.

world a more just place, even if this aim means we must give up preferences

Objectification imposes psychological harm in itself and also in its effect
of rendering people unable to flourish sexually. The feeling that this type of sex

which we would indulge in a more ideal world.
There are hard cases for my objections which intuitively seem immune to

is normal can make women wonder if there is something wrong with them for

them. What about the feminist couple that engages in inegalitarian sex in the

not enjoying the inegalitarian sex, a self-doubt that could plausibly count as one

privacy of their own home when they’re not volunteering in their community or

of Miranda Fricker’s “hermeneutical injustices.” What should one think of not

otherwise exemplifying excellent character and citizenship? What about the

enjoying the thing that just is sexy, as determined by an authority on the matter?

person whose first relationship had elements of inegalitarian sex and who has

Finally, the argument that inegalitarian preferences are morally neutral

come to develop a strong preference for it as a result? In a context where sexual

assumes that there is little gender inequality. Perhaps in an ideal world the

decisions take on a significance in light of social injustice, one may have a

sexual preferences I characterized as morally objectionable would not be so

reason in favor for not acting on or trying to change a preference. Sometimes

(because broader patterns and social context make these preferences

life is complicated, but this doesn’t mean that our choices can’t be morally

troublesome.) Maybe in a world where women’s sexualities weren’t assumed to

evaluated, and there is still room for saying a different choice is preferable.

be masochistic it wouldn’t raise concern if a straight man happened to be

Furthermore, the fact someone ought to have acted differently does not

interested in sex with a submissive female partner. But we don’t live in that ideal

automatically imply that we have all-things-considered reason to blame them. In

world, so insisting that one’s preferences are morally innocuous (in the ideal

a deeply unjust world, I don’t really have the appetite to condemn the woman

world) doesn’t mean it’s just fine to act on those preferences in our world,

who prefers inegalitarian sex. It’s hard enough for some women to have

especially when doing so would do harm and contribute to further injustice.

fulfilling sexual and romantic relationships; I’m not interested in blaming those

Furthermore, inegalitarian pornography is produced to satisfy a demand

who are oppressed by virtue of their gender. But the fact that some women have

and simultaneously reproduces the very demand which it satisfies. For this

inegalitarian preferences does not render those preferences innocuous even

reason, the continued preference for inegalitarian sex contributes to the

when both parties enthusiastically offer their consent.

continued production of inegalitarian pornography which perpetuates its social

Importantly, my criticism does not depend on the contents of a person’s

acceptance. Preferences for inegalitarian sex support stereotypes about women’s

mind – whether she believes herself to be inferior, her partner’s intentions, etc.

natural subordination by feeding into an industry that in turn perpetuates this

Nor is the issue strictly a matter of obtaining consent. Consent does not morally

belief. Maybe in a vacuum racialized preferences or preferences for inegalitarian

good (or not bad) sex make! All parties could feel good about their inegalitarian
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sex and not even be directly harmed, nonetheless it perpetuates the harms of
inegalitarian sex as an instance of a larger pattern that is morally objectionable.
Conclusion
Much of the force of the 'mere preferences' line of reasoning is that a
preference for inegalitarian sex, like other mere preferences, is morally
unobjectionable or socially insignificant. This ignores, I argue, the fact that these
inegalitarian preferences are morally problematic because of their social
consequences which include, but are not limited to: reinforcing the sexist beliefs
from which the preferences stem, preventing women from experiencing certain
sexual goods, wrongly portraying women as valuable insofar as they gratify
men, wrongly portraying women as limited in their sexual capacities, preventing
the formation of more egalitarian relationships, and in some of the worst cases,
causing what is widely recognized as deeply harmful, immoral sex (rape, for
example)16.
Maybe in a vacuum racialized preferences or preferences for inegalitarian sex
would be morally unobjectionable. Or maybe even in an unjust world these preferences
could be innocuous if only they were less ubiquitous. However, our world has a messy
legacy of a continuous history of oppression, and responsible people aiming to do good
should strive to behave in a way that makes our world a more just place, even if this aim
means we must give up preferences which we could indulge in a more ideal world.
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